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Personal Prologue and Introduction 
 
If one envisions a continuum from scholarly scholar to practical practitioner, I am somewhere 
between a practical scholar and a scholarly practitioner.  As Director of the MSU Product Center, 
I lead a boundary organization where we translate (1) practitioner knowledge and needs  for 
scholarly work to scholars, and (2) scholarly knowledge and needs for empirical work to practi-
tioners.  Those of us who are scholars in the field of agribusiness management often find our-
selves in this translational space serving two sets of peers—our academic peers in agricultural, 
food and resource economics (convert this phase into whatever your department name may be 
these days) and our industry peers in agricultural, food and bioeconomy firms.  What these two 
sets of peers want from us are distinctly different, and this difference creates pressures on our 
scholarship that can be difficult to manage.   
 
On the one hand, our industry peers want relevant, actionable prescriptions for firm and market 
behavior.  They are critical of “ivy tower” vocabulary and method.  These peers want us to be 
much the same as they are—to use methods that mimic their ways of knowing and understand-
ing.  On the other hand, our academic peers want elegant, rigorous contributions to knowledge.  
They decry much of agribusiness research as inappropriately qualitative or subjective.  These 
peers also want us to be much the same as they are—to use methods that mimic their ways of 
knowing and understanding.  Two distinct sets of peers, two distinct sets of demands for our be-
havior.  The differences between our two sets of peers arise largely from two distinct ways of 
knowing what they know—differences of epistemology.  If agribusiness researchers cannot find 
a reasonable epistemology for serving both sets of peers, we will not be effective either because 
(1) our scientific credentials will be continually at risk within the academy, or (2) our relevance 
will be continually questioned in industry. 
 
I have taken on this topic before.  In 1997, I presented an invited paper to the Agribusiness Re-
search Forum.  The paper was never formally published but it has been used nonetheless in vari-
ous research methodology courses in several agribusiness graduate programs.  A significant por-
tion of this paper is an updating and recasting of this earlier work.  The message is still needed as 
long standing tensions between our academic and industry peers are even more relevant today 
than 14 years ago.  The next to last section of the paper is entirely new and comes from recent 
work in “wicked problems.”  The paper ultimately argues that agribusiness scholars need to base 
their research on an epistemology of grounded theory and, for some particularly complex messy 
problems, an epistemology of engaged scholarship 
 
The Traditional Tension: Epistemologies of Practical and Positivistic 
Knowledge 
 
The Epistemology of Industry Peers 
 
Our industry peers have knowledge that arises from doing.  Their epistemology is straight for-
ward:  They know what they know because their knowledge works.  Their knowledge is derived 
from action.  Their methods of learning are through practice, stories, rules of thumb, and imita-
tion.  Practical knowledge is concrete, emerging from the actual complex and ambiguous context 
in which action is taken.  Since it arises from action, practical knowledge is actionable.  It is used Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




to predict and to prescribe.  Such knowledge is in part intuitive.  The decision maker may be 
guided by nothing more than a gut feel or a nearly instinctual response.   
 
Practical knowledge is non-scientific.
1  It is inherently subjective in that it is dictated by the 
unique perceptions, experiences, and practices of the actor.  Practical knowledge has low data 
integrity (Bonoma 1985) in that it can be prone to error and bias.  This in turn makes practical 
knowledge highly specific and thus weakly generalizable.  In addition, the decision maker makes 
little explicit attempt to discern any underlying structure to the situations faced.  Situations can 
thus be either viewed as largely unconnected or too easily assumed to be alike.  In either case, 
past experience tends to be consulted as a guide, rightly or wrongly. 
 
In the vocabulary of the knowledge management literature, practical knowledge is largely tacit 
(Takeuchi and Nonake 2000) being context-specific and informal arising from experience and 
practice.  It is only made explicit in the form of how-to manuals and best practices lists, but these 
explicit versions can never carry the full knowledge and nuance embedded in the practitioner’s 
experience.  Transferring practical knowledge to others is thus best accomplished through ap-
prenticeship and mentoring (Takeuchi and Nonaka 2000) when knowledge can arise from guided 
practice. 
 
The  agribusiness  scholar  cannot  take  on  the  decision  maker’s  epistemology  of  practical 
knowledge for two reasons.  First, the agribusiness scholar is part of the academy and thus needs 
to take on a scientific perspective in order to have legitimacy with academic peers.  Knowledge 
needs to be discovered and communicated in explicit form.  Second, even if adopting the episte-
mology of practical knowledge were legitimate academically, it would add no value to what de-
cision makers already do.  To adopt the decision maker’s epistemology is to become a decision 
maker.  We cannot in our classrooms, our research, or our outreach merely mimic the decision 
maker.  We can add no value by doing so because we can never know the complete context of 
the decision situation as well as the decision maker does.  Adopting the decision maker’s episte-
mology is thus not a feasible strategy for knowing.  Agribusiness research methods should not 
adopt the epistemology of our industry peers.  However, we cannot be so far removed from the 
decision maker’s way of knowing that we cannot contribute to it.  We are, in the end, applied 
scientists.  
 
The Epistemology of Academic Peers 
 
The most obvious contrast with practical knowledge is scientific (or theoretical) knowledge.  
However, our academic peers tend to pursue a specific form of scientific knowledge that tends to 
sharpen the contrast with practical knowledge.  As evidenced by the American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics and closely related professional journals, the prevailing academic epistemol-
ogy of agricultural economists is that of positivism.  Its methods are nearly always quantitative 
(Derbertin and Pagoulatos 1992).  This way of knowing is inherently scientific.  Positivistic 
knowledge is derived from theory and learned through deduction.  Such knowledge is abstract in 
                                                            
1Science like many terms is used extensively but we fail to be precise about its meaning.  For this article, science is 
defined as a method of obtaining knowledge that is objective and verifiable (Titus).  The problem is discerning what 
is objective and verifiable when in practice they are not absolute terms.  Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




that the detail and noise of context are filtered and reduced in search of an underlying cause-and-
effect structure and thus it aspires to be objective knowledge.  Yet, it attempts to be correspond-
ent with actual data (Johnson 1986), to have construct validity (Yin 1994) and be verifiable.  The 
knowledge is generalizable (has external validity) within the bounds of appropriate assumptions.  
When positivistic knowledge is properly correspondent, generalizable, and strongly causal, it can 
have significant predictive power.  Such knowledge is, in this sense, often useful to decision 
makers, even if it solves no specific problem. 
 
So central is the notion of objectivity to positivistic knowledge that some further exploration of 
what objectivity means is in order.  Knowledge is in part deemed objective when it has high data 
integrity (Bonoma1985); it is free of error and bias.  The desire for data integrity drives the aca-
demic researcher to  seek statistical  validity in  empirical  findings.   Objectivity also  arises  in 
knowledge that has clarity and coherence (Johnson 1986).  Knowledge has clarity if it unambig-
uous with a unique interpretation, as in a just-specified econometric system.  Knowledge has co-
herence if it follows logically from relevant theory and has no internal contradictions.  Coher-
ence and internal validity are comparable concepts.  The desire for clarity and coherence drives 
the academic researcher toward mathematical models with well-defined variables, exact identifi-
cation, and controlled measurement.  In fact, the greatest strength of positivistic knowledge is its 
clarity and coherence.  Finally, knowledge is objective in part because the researcher who dis-
covered it was objective in the search.  The researcher applies the tests of clarity, coherence, and 
correspondence and willingly abides by the results (Johnson 1986). 
 
Positivistic knowledge is ultimately limited by its level of abstraction.  The search for underlying 
structure, clarity, and coherence causes positivistic knowledge to ignore much of the detailed 
richness of a whole situation.  Its currency is limited (Bonoma 1985) in that its contextual rele-
vance is low and thus its applicability to any particular situation is limited.  For example, the 
generalizability of statistical validity has little relevance to a decision maker who must take ac-
tion in a setting that resembles but does not meet the exact conditions under which the positiv-
istic knowledge was found to hold.  Positivistic knowledge is predictive in terms of what may 
happen and can thus contribute to the analysis of a decision, but it alone is not prescriptive in 
telling a decision maker how to make it happen.  In sum, positivistic knowledge has limits on its 
ability to guide action precisely because its clarity and coherence does not lead to adequate detail 
about how and why to do specific actions.  Further, positivistic knowledge is weakened if the 
underlying cause-and-effect structure it claims to explain is itself under change.  If the structure 
is changing, then all insights gained from the knowledge are open to question. 
 
Examining the Tension between Peers 
 
The practical knowledge of industry peers and the positivistic knowledge of academic peers are 
in clear tension with one another.  Agribusiness researchers are pushed in two directions.  Indus-
try peers want enhancement of practice while academic peers want confirmation of theory.  Cer-
tain types of research questions (many of which have been the forte of traditional agricultural 
economists) allow the distance between practical knowledge and positivistic knowledge to be 
relatively small resulting in little tension between peers. 
 Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




Bonoma provides a critical characteristic of research problems that exhibit this short distance.  
This characteristic is the nature of the phenomena of interest, and here he proposes two subcate-
gories of concern.  First, can the phenomena of interest be studied separate from their natural set-
ting?  Second, are the phenomena amenable to quantification?  If the answer to both questions is 
yes, then positivistic knowledge and research methods are likely preferred.  In this case, concerns 
about correspondence and prescription can be minimized, and clarity and coherence can be given 
primary sway.  Industry peers will find the research reasonably applicable.  On the other hand, if 
the answer to either question is no, then positivism is of far less use.   
 
The research problems of agribusiness management often exhibit both characteristics of phe-
nomena that fall outside the strengths of positivism.  For example, the nature of effective practice 
in the strategic management of an agribusiness firm is not reducible to a quantifiable issue due to 
its complexity, but it is an important one for agribusiness researchers to examine nonetheless.  
The claim here is that in reducing strategic management to its quantifiable elements so much of 
reality is lost that the positivistic results are of little use.  The issue is not merely one of small 
numbers of observations; the issue is relevant complexity that defies quantification and separa-
tion from context.  Likewise, if one wishes to understand the dynamics of contract negotiations 
as they are evolving in the vertical coordination of the agri-food-bio system, some aspects of the 
phenomenon cannot be easily studied separate from being immersed in the full context of both 
parties to the negotiation.  Some quantification of contract terms and frequency of application 
can be achieved, but positivistic research alone cannot reveal full insight into the dynamics of 
how and why.  These examples also suggest that institutional economics generally is not likely 
successfully studied by positivistic methods.  Again, the limiting factor is not a matter of small 
numbers of observations or some restricted ability to quantify, but the fundamental inability to 
separate the phenomena from context. 
 
Beyond Bonoma’s two characteristics, one additional characteristic of the research setting de-
termines when a positivistic epistemology is appropriate:  To what extent is the underlying caus-
al structure stable or changing?  If the structure is stable, positivistic knowledge is possible and 
its methods can be pursued.  However, positivistic knowledge can be of very limited use in times 
of significant structural change.  
 
Again, most research issues of greatest relevance to agribusiness scholars fall outside the pur-
view of positivism.  First, the fundamental shifting of agricultural business structures and market 
arrangements (for example, the emergence of the food and fuel controversy as energy and food 
markets synchronize) suggests that underlying structure is changing dramatically.  No stable un-
derlying structure exists to study in many key situations.  Second, research into the area of busi-
ness strategy for agribusiness firms is the study of how firms can create and choose strategic al-
ternatives  that have  as  their fundamental  motivation altering the structure of the industry in 
which the firms operate.  When the goal of the phenomenon being studied is to alter structure, 
how can the phenomenon be studied with methods that assume the stability of structure?  Third, 
even when phenomena of interest appear stable, there may be no fundamental underlying struc-
ture to find.  Long ago management researchers gave up the notion of a general theory of man-
agement in that there is no one true way to manage.  The study of management only gives rise to 
what can be termed contingency or substantive theory (Gummesson 1991)—theory only made 
relevant in specific contexts.  Management research seeks to define the contingent characteristics Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




of circumstances that determine which of many alternative managerial approaches is best suited 
to a particular situation.  Positivism is of limited use in this effort. 
 
When the theory is strong, the phenomena are quantifiable and separable from context, and the 
structure is stable, positivistic epistemology and methods are appropriate.  The distance between 
our academic peers and our industry peers is relatively short in that theory leads to application 
rather efficiently and effectively.  However, most current phenomena of greatest interest to agri-
business scholars (the food and fuel controversy or strategic management generally) are amena-
ble in only limited ways to the positivistic approach.  Positivism can address side questions (fre-
quency, trend, and correlation) but not the main questions (how and why).   
 
Further, when underlying cause-and-effect structures are shifting or too complex to be reasona-
bly understood even in the abstract, practical knowledge is probably also at its weakest useful-
ness.  Rules of thumb cease to apply, standard operating procedures become ineffective, and 
normally reliable business instincts mislead. It can be hypothesized that the distance between our 
peers becomes a chasm in this case.  Industry peers want scholars to provide guidance precisely 
because the changing context takes them beyond the bounds of their experience.  Our traditional 
scholarly peers respond based on their normally reliable models, but end up making recommen-
dations that prove ineffective precisely because the changes take them beyond the bounds of 
their theory.  Our industry peers become very distresses with scholars at that point.  When this 
occurs, there is an alternative epistemology that can resolve the tension between our peers and 
offer a unique contribution for agribusiness research endeavors. 
 
An Alternative Epistemology: Grounded Theory 
 
Practical knowledge and positivistic knowledge both have great strength in their relevant do-
mains—practice and theory respectively.  Both face limits (perhaps severe) when: (1) new phe-
nomena fall outside the realm of their existing domains—in which either practice fails to be 
transferable or known theory does not apply, or (2) the causes of phenomena are so complex that 
practice cannot effectively deal with them and positivism provides ineffective partial explana-
tions.   
 
Professional schools—law, medicine, business—have recognized the limits of practice and posi-
tivistic science for a long time.  They have a history of case research and teaching as a significant 
part of the answer to the epistemological limits of other approaches.  More generally, so-called 
qualitative methods have emerged to fill the gap identified.  The methods are not themselves an 
epistemology but imply the existence of one.  Qualitative methods encompass a wide variety of 
approaches:  hermeneutics (Gummesson 1991; Jankowicz 1995) as well as naturalistic inquiry, 
social constructionism, and new paradigm inquiry (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 1991); 
reflection-in-action (Schon 1995); various forms of direct reference as qualitative research meth-
ods (Jankowicz 1995; Cassell and Symon 1994; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 1991; Ghau-
ri, Gronhaug and Kristianslund 1995).  Bitsch also lists “. . . phenomenological research, ethno-
methodology, ethnography, qualitative case study, participatory action research, and grounded 
theory.” (Bitsch 2005, 77)  All of these approaches have at least some intellectual ancestry in 
philosophical pragmatism (Johnson 1986).   
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In the 1997 version of this paper, phenomenology was used as the term to reference these collec-
tive approaches.  More compelling for this update is Bitsch’s use of grounded theory as the best 
representation of these methods and one that comes closest to describing an epistemology.  As 
she states, “Grounded theory, first published in 1967 by Glaser and Strauss, is the master meta-
phor of qualitative research.” (Bitsch 2005, 77)  Grounded theory is about extracting theory from 
the data and information of actual context.  It involves a cycle that starts with a phenomenon of 
research interest, moves to collection of rich context-based information, induces a first round of 
theory based on the concepts and constructs that arise from the information, continues with an-
other round of data gathering and induction, and ends when the induction-deduction cycle ceases 
to evolve the theory.  Bitsch is highly effective in elaborating the approach in substantial detail.  
An abbreviated discussion is presented here. 
 
At the heart of a grounded theory epistemology is the notion that the phenomena of interest can-
not be separated from their context.  To study human phenomena, the researcher must understand 
the holistic nature of the situation that created it.  Behavior and context are fundamentally inter-
dependent.  In this view, reality is socially constructed by the actors involved in the phenomena.  
To understand the phenomena, the researcher must understand the meanings and motivations of 
the actors. 
 
Similar to Schon’s concept of reflection-in-action, grounded theory knowledge can be thought of 
as built upon making explicit what decision makers know implicitly; and, by making it explicit 
and testable, the knowledge can become more objective rather than merely subjective.  Schon 
argues that knowledge arises from “subjecting to critique and testing the strategies, assumptions, 
or problem-settings implicit in a whole repertoire of situational responses.” (Schon 1995, 31). 
 
Grounded theory knowledge is derived from an iterative process that is both inductive and de-
ductive.  The academic researcher must observe the actual situation and the actions taken.  To 
these observations, the researcher attaches meaning through classification and comparison based 
on existing theory and/or the logic of the situation itself.  The researcher forms a tentative hy-
pothesis about the action, its causes, and its results.  This hypothesis can then be tested against 
other decision situations.  Subsequent testing will determine whether the hypothesis holds, needs 
to be modified, or abandoned.  This is what Bonoma calls the theory/data/theory revision cycle 
that he recommends to drive the process of case research.  It is also akin to some of the defining 
characteristics of qualitative research more generally in which the researcher seeks “to formulate 
new hypotheses and alter old ones as the research progresses, in the light of emerging insights.” 
(Cassell and Symon 1994, 4).    
 
Decision makers themselves often engage in such an iterative process in real time.  Schon gives 
an example of how a decision maker engages in action, is surprised by the results of the action, 
and instantly restructures his or her understanding of the situation.  “On the basis of this restruc-
turing, he invents a new strategy of action and tries out the new action he has invented, running 
an on-the-spot experiment whose results he interprets, in turn, as a ‘solution,’ an outcome on the 
whole satisfactory, or else as a new surprise that calls for a new round of reflection and experi-
ment.”  (p. 30)   The academic researcher can make this process explicit, expand it to multiple 
situations, and bring theory and objectivity to the iterative process. 
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Grounded theory knowledge is scientific.  Its Kantean cycle of induction, deduction, and verifi-
cation is a form of the scientific method (Kenemy Titus).  Grounded theory knowledge is ab-
stract in that it is articulated in the medium of words and ideas.  It can meet the criteria of objec-
tivity, clarity, coherence, and data integrity.  (The degree to which it meets these criteria will be 
addressed in the next section.) 
 
The ability to generalize grounded theory knowledge is an obvious and central issue in its legiti-
macy as an epistemology.  Citing and elaborating on Guba and Lincoln, Bitsch presents transfer-
ability as paralleling external validity and generalizability in quantitative research.  “Transfera-
bility refers to determining the extent to which findings can be applied in other contexts or with 
other respondents . . . . the burden of prove shifts from the researcher to the person who wants to 
apply the research results.” (Bitsch 2005, 85)  The user is aided in transferability by the research-
er’s use of (1) “thick description” (Geertz) that provides interpretative and rich enough detail for 
judging probable alternative applications, and (2) purposeful sampling that assures the research 
process examined typical and atypical cases to test the limits of application scope.  (Bitsch 2005)  
Schon calls for generalization “. . . not as covering laws
2 but through what I call ‘reflective trans-
fer,’ that is, by carrying them over into new situations where they may be put to work and tested, 
and found to be valid and interesting, but where they may also be reinvented.” (p. 31)   Yin pos-
its that generalizing case findings is not the same as statistical generalization in positivism.  Ra-
ther, case studies, as with experiments in the natural sciences, rely on analytical generalization 
from a particular set of results to some broader theory.  Gummesson argues that local theory ap-
plicable to particular situations has value in and of itself even if broad generalization is not pos-
sible.  The situation adds new richness to the understanding of possible behaviors and responses. 
 
Grounded theory knowledge has an inherent dynamism that makes it highly useful in times of 
change.  Grounded theory methods can be used even if the underlying structure is not stable.  
Working hypotheses can be readily altered and expanded in order to maintain correspondence 
with emerging conditions.  The methods of grounded theory reflect the claims of Cassell and 
Symon for qualitative methods more generally in that these methods “. . . are sensitive enough to 
allow the detailed analysis of change. . . . With quantitative methods we may be able to assess 
that a change has occurred over time but we cannot say how (what processes were involved) or 
why (in terms of circumstances and stakeholders).” (p. 5) 
 
The differences between practical, positivistic and grounded theory knowledge are presented in 
Table 1.  Grounded theory knowledge can add value for decision makers because of its increased 
levels of objectivity and generalizability versus practical knowledge.  Decision makers can be 
less given to error in experience transfer and in understanding what factors actually matter in the 
decision situations  faced.  In contrast  to  positivistic knowledge,  grounded theory knowledge 
finds its greatest applicability to research settings in which established theory is weak or nonex-
istent, the phenomena of interest are not readily quantifiable nor separable from context, and the 
underlying cause-and-effect structure is unstable or not given to general theory.   
 
 
                                                            
2By covering law Schon means “a general, perhaps statistical, proposition applicable to all instances in which certain 
combinations of variables are present.” (p. 31) Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




Table 1. Comparative Aspects of the Three Types of Knowledge 
Aspects of Knowledge  Practical Knowledge  Grounded Theory 
Knowledge 
Positivistic Knowledge 
Goals for Understanding  How things are done. 
Replication of past suc-
cess. 
Development of standard 
operating procedures. 
Why things happen in a 
socially-constructed 
world. 
Development of “local” 
theory. 
Why things happen in an 
external and objective 
world. 
Development of “general” 
theory. 
How Learned  Practice, story, experi-
ence, rules of thumb, imi-
tation. 
Trial and error. 
Induction-deduction-
validation cycle with em-
phasis on induction. 
Scientific method. 
Induction-deduction-
validation cycle with em-
phasis on deduction. 
Scientific method. 






Form of Knowledge  Mostly tacit with explicit 
expression of best practic-
es or procedures 
Mostly explicit with cau-
tions about users sensitivi-
ty to tacit practice 





  data integrity 
  construct validity 
     internal validity 
 clear causality 

























Ability to Generalize 
(External Validity or 
Transferability) 
Limited by experience  Analytically transferable  Statistically transferable  
Predictive Power  High within bounds of 
experience 
High within bounds of 
working hypotheses 
High within bounds of 
theory 
Prescriptive Power  High 
 
High  High to limited depending 
upon level of detail need-
ed 
Actionable  High  High  High to limited depending 
upon complexity of con-
text 
Ability to Address 
Changing Structure 
Moderate  High  High to limited depending 
upon method of derivation 
 
The three types of knowledge—practical, positivistic, and grounded theory—lie on a continuum.  
Some decision makers pursue practical knowledge in a nearly scientific manner, searching for 
underlying structure and attempting to drive out bias and thus moving across the continuum to-
ward grounded theory knowledge.  Positivists can and do give up some of their clarity and co-
herence to improve the correspondence of what they know about the world, and thus they move 
across the continuum.  Some quantitative techniques, such as factor analysis, occupy a spot on 
the continuum between grounded theory and positivistic knowledge (although purists on both 
sides may not agree.)  Objectivity and subjectivity, as well as concreteness and abstraction, are 
not absolute terms empirically.  The issue really becomes what tradeoffs scholars or practitioners 
are willing to make in order to know what they know. Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




Grounded Theory Knowledge and Rigor 
 
To a strict adherent of positivistic epistemology, the objectivity and generalizability of grounded 
theory knowledge may appear questionable.  Positivists will argue that this third way of knowing 
lacks what has come to be called “rigor.”  Ultimately, academic legitimacy hinges on whether or 
not an appropriate rigor can be defined for grounded theory knowledge.  If for no other reason, 
agribusiness scholars must find reasonable ways to signal in journal articles and other scholarly 
writings that the standards of grounded theory rigor were known and followed by the author.  
This signaling will not be easy since the more qualitative nature of grounded theory knowledge 
necessitates lengthy output that may strain usual editorial standards for article length or the read-
er’s patience in wading through the material (Cassell and Symon 1994).  A corollary to this point 
is that the reviewers for journals must accept the legitimacy of grounded theory methods and be 
prepared to provide appropriate critique. 
 
If rigor is defined by the careful adherence to tests of scientific validity and reliability, the evalu-
ation of grounded theory research can achieve both tests.  Appropriate standards of rigor can be 
articulated, but these standards differ from positivistic standards.  Based on the complexity and 
ambiguity of real decisions, grounded theory knowledge will never achieve the level of clarity or 
coherence argued earlier to be the hallmarks of positivistic knowledge.  The tradeoff is height-
ened correspondence and improved prescription.  Grounded theory knowledge is actionable in 
that the richness of context can be significantly preserved while some level of abstraction is sac-
rificed. 
 
Table 2 attempts to provide a starting point for defining rigor for grounded theory knowledge.  It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to go further.  (See Bitsch for a more extensive examination of 
this issue.) 
 
First, grounded theory knowledge has been rigorously derived if appropriate research methods 
were used.  The preferred methods of conducting grounded theory research include, but are not 
limited to, case studies, archival analyzes, semi-structured or fully-structured interviews and sur-
veys, field experiments, critical incident analyzes, repertory grid techniques, cluster analysis, fac-
tor analysis, conjoint analysis, and structural equation modeling.  The earlier entries in this list 
are largely qualitative, but the latter entries involve quantitative analysis, albeit mostly of qualita-
tive (often categorical) data.  Rather than define and elaborate on each of these techniques here, 
the author simply wants to establish that these techniques exist and have a supporting literature 
of their own. 
 
Second, construct validity, internal validity, reliability and external validity can be achieved for 
grounded theory approaches, and the key questions related to assessing each of these is presented 
in the table. Most especially, researchers should focus on high correspondence and effective pre-
scription as standards by which grounded theory knowledge is judged.  In addition, data integrity 
must be a critical concern and should be based on (1) proper triangulation (Bonoma, Cassell and 
Symon, Yin, Bitsch) in one or more of four forms self-reported and archived information, multi-
ple investigator perspectives, multiple theoretical perspectives, or multiple methods of gathering 
and interpreting data, and (2) appropriate precautions against researcher bias arising from close 
interaction with decision makers.  Clarity arises from careful description, classification, and Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




Table 2. Comparative Characteristics of Grounded theory and Positivistic Knowledge 
Characteristics of 
Knowledge  
Grounded Theory of Knowledge  Positivistic Knowledge 
Researcher Goals:  Focus on meanings. 
Try to understand happenings. 
Look at the totality of each situation. 
Develop ideas through induction from 
data. 
Develop “local” theory. 
Focus on facts. 
Seek causality & fundamental laws. 
Reduce situation to simplest elements. 
Formulate hypotheses and then test 
them. 
Develop “general” theory. 
Applicable Research  
Setting: 
Theory construction 
Phenomena need not be quantifiable 
Phenomena not separable from context 
Unstable or nonexistent structure 
Theory confirmation 
Quantifiable phenomena 
Phenomena separable from context 
 
Stable underlying structure 
Preferred Methods:  Using multiple methods to establish 
different views of phenomena. 
Small samples investigated in depth or 
over time. 
Operationalizing concepts so that they 
can be measured. 
Taking large samples. 
Construct Validity   Has the researcher gained full access to 
the knowledge and meaning of inform-
ants? 
Does an instrument measure what it is 
supposed to measure? 
Internal Validity  
(Clarity and Coherence) 
Has the researcher uncovered the logic 
of the phenomena observed either by 
applying existing theory or laying bare 
the inherent order of the situation itself 
in new theory?  
Has the researcher properly deducted 
and tested the hypothesis?  
Reliability  
(Data Integrity) 
Will similar observations be made by 
different researchers on different occa-
sions? 
Has triangulation of data been appropri-
ately handled? 
Will the measure yield the same results 
on different occasions (assuming no real 
change in what is to be measured)? 
Generalizability  
(External Validity or 
Transferability) 
How likely is it that ideas and theories 
generated in one setting will also apply 
in other settings? 
What is the probability that patterns 
observed in a sample will also be pre-
sent in the wider population from which 
the sample is drawn? 
 Source. Rows 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are adapted from Easterby-Smith et al. 
 
 
comparison of observed situational phenomena rather than from precise definitions and meas-
urements.  Thus clarity is qualitatively achieved (based on experience) rather than quantitatively.  
Coherence arises by bringing logical order to the phenomena observed either by applying exist-
ing theory or laying bare the inherent order of the situation itself in new theory.  Objectivity aris-
es from the clarity, coherence, and data integrity already mentioned, and in addition from sub-
jecting both the methods and results to peer review.  Rigor is attainable for grounded theory 
knowledge, and agribusiness scholars have a responsibility to properly define it and practice it. 
 
The New Tension: Wicked Problems and Engaged Scholarship 
 
An epistemology of grounded theory rigorously carried out in methods can go a long way toward 
allowing agribusiness scholars to serve their two sets of peers, industrial and academic.  But, 
such an epistemology may not be enough for a certain class of problems that we are increasing 
asked to address, so-called wicked problems (Rittel and Webber 1993; Conklin 2006; Batie Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




2008).   Wicked problems, a term from the 1970s social planning literature, have the essential 
characteristic that they are not solvable; they can only be managed.  As part of their manage-
ment, special roles exist for both new knowledge and full stakeholder engagement in the research 
process itself. 
 
Sustainability serves as one example of a wicked problem that many agribusiness scholars (as 
well as many agricultural natural scientists) are being asked to address today.  Table 3 presents a 
list of defining criteria for a wicked problem and how sustainability meets these criteria.  Fuel vs. 
food, global warming, and even business strategy itself (Camillus) are other examples.   
 
Table 3. Sustainability as a Wicked Problem  
Criteria for a Wicked Problem  Sustainability 
No definitive formulation of the problem exists.  Ideal definition lacks specificity and is reduced to slogan 
or tagline such as triple bottom line (economic, social 
and environmental) performance 
Its solution is not true or false, but rather better or worse.  One can never know if sustainability has been achieved.  
Only progress in its trajectory can be predicted. 
Stakeholders have radically different frames of reference 
concerning the problem, and are often passionate in their 
position on the problem. 
Businesses strongly favor economic outcomes. 
Environmental groups strongly favor environmental 
outcomes. 
Social justice groups strongly favor social outcomes, 
such as fair wages and equitable access. 
System components and cause/effect relationships are 
uncertain or radically changing. 
Many claims are made about what is sustainable (such as 
local food systems are sustainability while global food 
systems are not) with unclear knowledge of what system 
characteristics assure or even promote sustainability. 
 
Based on the criteria, one realizes why wicked problems cannot be solved—they have no closed-
form definition, their “solution” can only be thought of in relative terms, stakeholders will be in 
conflict over solutions and actions, and the system is not understood well enough to effect entire-
ly purposeful change.  Wicked problems can be managed and their effective management focus-
es on actions toward two desired system outcomes: 
 
• Improved impact, moving system components in a desirable direction 
• Meaningful process, effectively responding to the relevant stakeholders who can veto 
as well as enable action in any direction 
 
Potential options to improve impact can be meaningless if the process results in stalemate, while 
endless process can result in no action to improve impact.  Impact and process outcomes must be 
achieved simultaneously. 
 
Further, each stakeholder brings strongly held existing knowledge to the management process.  
This existing explicit and tacit knowledge is deficient in two respects: 
 
•  Existing knowledge of one stakeholder is suspect to other stakeholders because of issues 
arising from trust, transparency and credibility of sources. 
•  Existing knowledge freezes the system tradeoffs that give rise to the conflicting system 
outcomes that divide the stakeholders in the first place. Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




The argument runs that only new knowledge can overcome these deficiencies.  The process has 
legitimacy when the new knowledge is derived together with the stakeholders.  When the 
creation of the new knowledge centers on system innovation, then more acceptable impact 
tradeoffs can emerge even to the point of converting existing tradeoffs into new complements 
through deeper systems understanding and redesign. 
 
Knowledge institutions and their scholars have a role in managing wicked problems like sustain-
ability when they understand how research can be beneficial to the process outcomes as well as 
the more traditional impact outcomes.  Given the messy underlying understanding of the system 
at work in a wicked problem, the grounded theory epistemology already advocated in the paper 
would seem to have great fit to this context.  Agribusiness scholars would seem to be of signifi-
cant value to the context as well. 
 
An epistemology of grounded theory may be a necessary condition for contributing to the man-
agement of wicked problems, but is likely not sufficient on two counts: 
 
•  Many more disciplines are needed than those of agribusiness scholars to address the full 
system analysis and synthesis needed for impact outcomes.  These problems are even be-
yond multidisciplinary approaches (pooling individual disciplinary knowledge) demand-
ing instead transdisciplinary approaches (collective disciplines creating new knowledge 
together). 
•  The stakeholders need to be engaged throughout the research enterprise in order to have 
its results be meaningful and legitimate to the desired process outcomes.  The stakehold-
ers cannot merely be there at the beginning of process (to articulate their needs) and at the 
end of the process (to receive the results).  They must be there throughout the process to 
assure that the research stays on track and will have stakeholder credibility when the re-
sults are known.  The researcher will need to manage the rigor of the research, but the re-
search will be done in a fishbowl unlike our traditional research expectations of objective 
separation.  
 
An epistemology of engaged scholarship that encompasses all of the above is essential when 
working in the arena of wicked problems.  This realization is entirely consistent with the historic 
and contemporary literature that surrounds wicked problems.  (See Peterson 2009; Batie 2009; 
Fear et al. 2006; and Bitsch (2009) for contemporary analyses related to agricultural and natural 
resource systems.)  If agribusiness scholars are to excel in this arena, then they must work with 
rigor not just in grounded theory but also in engaged scholarship.  There is no rest for the weary.  




What then should we do as agribusiness scholars to assure that we serve our traditional industrial 
and academic peers and the even broader set of stakeholder peers facing wicked problems?  Sev-
en recommendations are made. 
 
First, we should pursue grounded theory knowledge and adopt its methods when our research 
calls for such an approach.  As already argued, grounded theory knowledge adds value for our Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




business peers and keeps us in the academy with our academic peers.  But beyond that, the rapid 
changes occurring in the agri-food-bio system and the presence of wicked problems signal that 
causal relationships are in a state of flux or system complexity makes them extremely hard to 
uncover.  In either case, grounded theory knowledge is especially appropriate.  The phenomena 
we study, both inter-firm and intra-firm, are not easily studied separate from the richness of con-
text and are not readily given to quantification.  Grounded theory knowledge fits well with the 
situations in which we conduct the vast majority of our research as scholars. 
 
Second, as members of the academy, we bear a responsibility to define further an appropriate 
level of rigor for grounded theory knowledge and its methods.  This paper only begins this pro-
cess.  We need to consult the research methods of related social sciences and mine the richness 
of methodological diversity found there.  
 
Third, we must teach grounded theory methods to our graduate students and learn how to use 
them ourselves.  As agricultural economists, most of us have been trained in positivistic methods 
and most of our graduate programs require that our students learn positivistic methods.  Qualita-
tive and grounded theory methods must be adequately represented in our curricula.  Quantitative 
techniques more appropriate to qualitative data, including conjoint analysis, factor analysis, clus-
ter analysis, structural equation modeling, must also be part of the curricula.  We will quickly 
need to determine to what extent the traditional agricultural economics doctoral program can 
produce scholars that have adequate backgrounds to do both positivistic and grounded theory 
research.  Two distinct, yet compatible programs may well be called for. 
 
Fourth, as agribusiness scholars, we must willingly recognize when positivistic knowledge will 
be most helpful.  When the theory is strong, the phenomena are quantifiable and separable from 
context, and the structure is stable, we need to recognize the legitimacy of the positivistic epis-
temology.  In addition, our grounded theory insights can enhance positivistic theories and meth-
ods in order to improve their correspondence to the world we encounter.  We need broad collab-
oration across methods, and not intellectually pure camps trading barbs.  At the same time, our 
research cannot be merely derivative of or subservient to our traditional agricultural economics 
peers.  We must add value through our different perspectives and approaches. 
 
Fifth, in a world of wicked problems, we must use our command of grounded theory to contrib-
ute to transdisciplinary research and to engage with stakeholders in this arena.  Our contributions 
here may be even more challenging to our existing peers in the academic, but I suspect that our 
industry peers need our participation in managing these even more intractable problems. 
 
Sixth, we must test our research-derived knowledge with our industry peers and not just our aca-
demic peers.  Do practicing managers find our research results actionable?  Do our research re-
sults further the evolution of management practice?  Industry peers need to answer these ques-
tions in the affirmative if we are to be judged relevant.  Further, we need to have our industry 
peers engage in our work in exchange for our delivering relevant research-based knowledge.  We 
need access to qualitative and quantitative data and information.  Continuing privatization of data 
and  limiting  access  to  industry  decision  makers  make  meaningful  grounded  theory  research 
harder to pursue effectively.  Industry peers need to open appropriate access to us, and we need 
to honor that access with appropriate confidentiality.  We also need them to open their minds to Peterson / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




the limitations of their own practice and to the usefulness of science and theory when it comes to 
transferring knowledge from one application to another or one situation to another.  We need to 
intellectually spar with each other and not merely have one side or the other represent what they 
know as ultimate truth (practically or theoretically) rather than the best available knowledge for 
the moment.  This process requires rich, vital relationships between industry and scholars, and 
not incidental meetings here and there at conferences, nor encounters merely about students for 
employment. 
 
Finally, we must reach out to our two sets of peers and ask that they understand our potential and 
our limitations as well as their own if we are to work together effectively.  Our business peers 
must understand that we cannot mimic their way of knowing or that of practicing business con-
sultants.  Their world is one of practical knowledge.  Our academic peers must understand that 
we cannot mimic, in most instances, their positivistic knowledge because it removes us from the 
context in which actual decisions must be made.  In return, we must strive to retain our commit-
ment to science and to a research rigor that is appropriate to grounded theory and ultimately to 
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